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Commentary/Boden: Creative mind
devastating argument against those1 \h iming computers can be
creative: Computers can't create anything. For creation re-
quires, minimally, originating something. But computers origi-
nate nothing; they merely do that which we order them, via
programs, to do. Boden finds this argument "too quick and too
simple" (p. 6), and she begins her book by decomposing Love-
lace's attack into four questions (p. 7) around which her entire
essay then revolves:
Ql Can computational ideas help us understand how hu-
man creativity is possible?
Q2 Could computers (now or in the future) ever do things
which at least appear to be creative?
Q3 Could a computer ever appear to recognize creativity?
Q4 Could computers themselves every really be creative?
Boden's answers to these questions, and her defense of those
answers, constitute her essay. My comments, with defense,
constitute my reaction and refutation. In outline, they look like
this:
Boden
Ql Yes.
Q2 Yes - but a guarded yes.
Q3 Yes — but a guarded yes.
Q4 No, probably not.
Bringsjord
No, not really.
Yes, obviously!
Yes, obviously!
No.
Q4, Boden tells us, is actually beside the point, and she rele-
gates discussion of it to the final chapter:
For reasons explained in the final chapter, I would probably answer
No' to the fourth question. Perhaps you would, too. However, this
hypothetical moral decision-making about imaginary artificial crea-
tures is irrelevant to our main purpose: understanding human cre-
ativity. For even if we answer No to the fourth Lovelace-question,
the affirmative answers to the first three questions can stand, (p. 11)
Ah, but when we reach the final chapter we find the book's big
surprise (p. 274): John Searle's (1980) Chinese Room (CR)
answer to Q4 is a negative one which implies that his answer to
Ql would be "perhaps, but not at a fundamental level. ' The
point is a twofold one: Searle's negative answer to Q4 implies,
contra Boden (p. 11), an anti-Boden answer to Ql; and, this
implication is one Boden herself affirms (p. 274). The implication
is straightforward: CR supposedly shows that executing a
computer program cannot give to that which executes it bona
fide understanding; such execution can only bestow a mindless
ability to move symbols around. An affirmative answer to Ql
presupposes that "computational psychology" (which comprises
for Boden the writing of programs Searle parodies) can provide
genuine insights into human creativity, so embracing CR means
at best a half-hearted "Perhaps" on Ql, or, as I put it on my side
of the chart above, "No, not really" - since mindlessly moving
squiggle-squoggles around is somewhat unlikely to reveal how
Hamlet came to be.
Let Qn-_ ^> Qn-_, abbreviate the form of the implication
we've just isolated. What other relations of this sort are true?
Boden herself affirms (p. 10)
Q2-Y-guarded 4> Q3-Y-guarded
by reasoning which would also sanction
Q2-Y-obviously! => Q3-Y-obviously!
These conditionals, conjoined with the one we unearthed
above,
Q4-N => Ql-N, not really,
imply that if the answer to Q4 is "No," and if the answer to Q2 is
"Yes, obviously!," then Boden's entire project (which is in large
part an attempt to demonstrate that Q2 and Q3 are to be
answered with a sedulous, reflective "Yes") is threatened by
inferences of a sort noncreative computers of today can ef-
fortlessly perform.
Why is the answer to Q2 an emphatic and obvious affirmative?
The argument is short and simple: First, note that the "could' in
Q2 is for Boden an "in principle" could (e.g., see p. 10). Well, it is
surely possible, in principle, that computers of the future will be
judged creative on purely behavioral grounds. This can be
established by a thought-experiment in which computers osten-
sibly do all sorts of creative things - an imagined future in which
our silicon-based friends generate Balzacian novels, engage in
conversations with the literati about Shakespearean sonnets,
and generate symphonies that would have Beethoven himself
salivating. Remember, the point isn't that such a future will as a
matter of fact arrive (on that score Boden is herself prudently
agnostic, hence the guarded affirmative to Ql and Q2); the point
is that it is in principle possible that our future holds AIs which
appear, on behavioral grounds, to be creative. "Hold on," you
say, in synchrony with Boden, "for a computer to appear to be
creative in the sense intended, its internal workings would have
to be of the right sort." True enough, but the objection is
surmounted by adding to our "gedankenexperiment" a pinch
more imagination: we have only to watch the innards of our
"creative' computers being probed by skeptical cognitive scien-
tists, resulting in the discovery of unbelievably complex sys-
tems, whose details are impenetrable, but whose broad strokes
suggest that they are nth generation descendants of today's AI
systems. (Traditional symbolicist systems were in 1995 given the
capacity to evolve in wild ways with help from connectionist-
based sensors and effectors, and by 2005 our synthetic rival to
Beethoven arrives.)
Doesn't Boden dispose of Searle's CR? Perhaps. But another
Q4-N rationale, which she touches upon in her final chapter,
may well support the "Q4-N => Ql-N, not really" conditional.
This rationale for Q4-N is a variant on what Boden calls (pp. 278-
281) the "consciousness argument" (a variant specified in
Bringsjord 1994): (a) Creativity requires inner, first-person-
point-of-view, something-it's-like-to-be consciousness, (b) No
computer could ever be conscious in this sense. Ergo; (c) no
computer can ever be creative. Boden would simply pronounce
this line of reasoning "iffy" (p. 281) and go her merry way. This
would seem to be a dangerous response, however, given that a
number of thinkers have argued explicitly for (b), for example
Jackson (1982); Kripke (1971); Nagel (1974); Searle (1992); and
Bringsjord (1991). But why might (a) be true? Connected to the
Boden-covered area of computer generated literature, the sup-
porting argument, encapsulated, is this: in order to produce
sophisticated fiction, an author, whether human or artificial,
must adopt the points of view of the characters involved, but if X
adopts the point of view of Y, then X itself has a point of view.
Boden's reaction would doubtless be: "But look at the point-of-
view-/ree computational accounts of literary creativity can-
vassed in my Chapter 7!" This, of course, is nothing but a
statement of faith - faith that these techniques can work. Well,
here we can trade. I too have faith, faith based on failure: after
toiling for three years as a PI in a well-funded group effort
(known as Autopoeisis) to realize, by following the computational
techniques Boden praises in her seventh chapter, the sort of
storytelling AI she thinks possible, I have no reason whatever to
think (b) anything but depressingly true.
What is the difference between real creativity
and mere novelty?
Alan Bundy
Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh
EH1 1HN, Scotland; a.bundy@ed.ac.uk
1. Introduction. In The creative mind, Boden advances both a
general thesis about creativity and a more specific one. The
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general thesis is that creativity can be scientifically understood
in computational terms. This general thesis has my enthusiastic
and wholehearted support. The specific thesis is that what
distinguishes "real creativity" from "mere novelty" is the "map-
ping, exploration, and transformation of conceptual spaces."
"Mere novelty" is just the generation of a new object from an
existing conceptual space. It is this specific thesis that I wish to
investigate.
2. Mathematical creativity? Consider the following AI case
study. Larry Wos and his coworkers at Argonne National Labora-
tory in Illinois have used an automated theorem prover to solve
open conjectures in mathematics (Wos 1993). Many of these
open conjectures were suggested by human mathematicians.
The conjectures came mostly from areas of mathematics in
which human mathematicians had developed few intuitions
about guiding proofs, for example, ternary boolean algebra.
They were fed to a fairly standard but very efficiently encoded
resolution theorem prover (initially AURA, more recently OT-
TER), which used brute force methods guided by a few simple,
syntactic heuristics. Sometimes millions of intermediate formu-
lae are generated in the search for a proof. The resulting proofs
have sometimes been published in the mathematics literature
(Wos et al. 1983).
Is this an example of artificial creativity? According to Boden's
specific thesis, the answer is an unequivocal no; this is mere
novelty. The automated theorem prover is merely generating
something new from an existing conceptual space. The concep-
tual space here is the search space defined by the application of
resolution to the axioms of a mathematical theory and the open
conjecture.
On the other hand, mathematics is often regarded as one of
the pinnacles of human intellectual achievement. The proof of
an open conjecture by a human mathematician would usually be
regarded as an act of real creativity, not mere novelty, especially
if this open conjecture has defeated other mathematicians.
However, the proof of open conjectures often appears to involve
no more than what Boden characterizes as "mere novelty," the
combination of rules of inference in a predefined mathematical
theory.
3. A complexity requirement. One way to resolve this conflict
would be to add an element of complexity into the requirements
for creativity, that is, to regard generation from an existing
conceptual space as creative rather than merely novel, if the
conceptual space is large and complex, and if the generation is
from some little explored part of that space. Boderi also seems to
recognise this possibility. She quotes Dickens's "a squeezing,
wrenching, grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous old sinner"
as an example of creativity, while admitting (p. 49) that under
her definition it is only "mere novelty." She excuses this devia-
tion on the grounds that, although the grammar of English
admits "sevenfold strings of adjectives" this part of the concep-
tual space was previously unexplored. Similar remarks apply to
the poetry of Coleridge and the music of Mozart. However,
although she describes these counterexamples to her specific
thesis, Boden does not draw any general conclusions about the
need to modify that thesis nor about the kind of modification
required. My proposal of a complexity requirement aims to plug
that gap.
The complexity requirement cuts both ways. There are also
examples of the mapping, exploration, and transformation of
conceptual spaces which we would not want to count as real
creativity. Consider mathematics again. Under the specific
thesis, real creativity is only involved when the mathematical
theory is changed. But changes to a mathematical theory are
easily made. Take the axioms of group theory and delete one - or
generate a new formula at random and add it as a new axiom. Of
course, most such changes will fail Boden's criterion of value.
There will be no applications for the new theory or few interest-
ing theorems provable. However, if the value criterion is fac-
tored out, the complexity criterion is still required. A simple
change to an existing theory counts for less than a radical change
- compare the original axiomatisation of group theory to the
later modifications to semigroups or rings.
4. Transformation as generation. It is no coincidence that
similar criteria should apply when assessing creativity both in
the generation and in the transformation of conceptual spaces.
Transformation is a kind of generation - but at the metalevel. A
conceptual space is defined by some kind of grammar. Genera-
tion is the application of rules of that grammar. If that grammar
is regarded as a data structure then transformation can be
effected by a metagrammar, whose rules modify the original
grammar. For example, the metagrammar for generating new
mathematical theories might have rules for deleting old axioms
and adding new ones. Thus, the "real creativity" of transforming
conceptual spaces is just the "mere novelty" of generating from
an existing conceptual space, but at the metalevel.
This observation further undermines Boden's specific thesis.
It also explains the enthusiasm, among some AI researchers,
for symbolic representations, especially declarative ones. A
declarative grammar is readily viewed both as a procedure for
generating novel objects and as a data structure which can be
transformed into a new grammar. There is no need for repre-
sentational redescription; the mapping and exploration phases
of creativity are trivial and only transformation using a meta-
grammar is required. This advantage is lost to some extent by
procedural representations and it is totally lost by subsymbolic
representations.
These observations might lead us to locate "real" creativity in
the representational redescription of nondeclarative represen-
tations or in the invention of transformational metagrammars. It
is usually a mistake, however, to regard one aspect of an
intellectual process as the key with the others playing only a
supporting role. "Real" intelligence appears to arise from the
interplay of a number of relatively mundane processes.
5. A self-reflection requirement. Complexity seems a rather
crude criterion for the assessment of creativity. Returning to the
automated proof of open conjectures, we can see another objec-
tion to be the brute force nature of the search for a proof. Real
mathematicians surely reflect more on what they are doing.
They bring known methods of proof to direct their search and
they sometimes invent new methods of proof during the search.
Indeed, the invention of a new proof method is often more
highly regarded by fellow mathematicians than the new proof
itself.
These notions of proof method and self-reflection can also be
represented computationally. For example, I have tried to do
this in my own work on proof plans (Bundy 1991). Proof
planning is represented as the exploration of a metalevel con-
ceptual space composed of proof methods. Generation in this
metalevel space consists of reasoning about the problems to be
solved and the methods available for their solution. This sug-
gests an alternative modification to Boden's specific thesis.
"Mere novelty" may arise as the unreflective generation of new
objects from an existing conceptual space. "Real creativity" may
arise when that generation involves some aspect of self-
reflection, that is, the simultaneous reasoning about the genera-
tion process at the metalevel.
6. Conclusion. I suspect, however, that all attempts to charac-
terise creativity simply in computational terms are doomed to
failure. Creativity can be explained computationally, but it is not
a natural computational kind, that is, it does not correspond to
some well-defined family of computational processes. Rather,
what we call creativity in folk psychology corresponds to particu-
lar aspects of many different kinds of computational processes.
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